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FOREWORD 
This is one of three papers derived from research on NorthSouth  
resource trade performed in the System and Decision Sciences Area during 
the summer of 1982. The aim of this research was, first, to construct a model 
of Nor thSouth  resource trade and then to use it as a framework for further 
work in gaming, negotiations, and interactive decision making. 
In this paper, Graciela Chichilnisky investigates the impact of resource 
export policies on the major macro variables of exporting and importing 
economies, and shows that the effects of increasing resource exports can be 
either beneficial or harmful, depending on the structure of the economy and 
the endogenous factor prices. 
ANDRZEJ WIERZBICKI 
C%azrrnan 
System and Decision Sciences 
This paper explores the impact of resource export policies on the major 
macro variables of exporting and importing economies. Two regions, North 
and South, trade resources for industrial goods. Each region produces two 
goods with three factors: capital, labor and resources. The relative prices in 
the five factor and goods markets, as well as the  outputs, consumption and 
international trade levels, are all determined endogenously. The general 
equilibrium is parameterized by the volume of resources traded. 
An increase in resource exports may be either beneficial or  harmful, 
depending on the  characteristics of the trading economies. When the  South's 
economy is dual, the  North's homogeneous, and the  rates of profit a re  high, 
increases in resource exports are associated with lower real wages, employ- 
ment and consumption in the  South; the  South's terms of trade and i ts  export 
revenues decrease. This is traced to  changes in the  domestic terms of trade 
between the traditional and the industrial sectors. However, the profits in the  
South increase, thus explaining in part the expansion of exports under these 
circumstances. 
More favorable outcomes are obtained by increasing resource exports 
when the exporting economy is more homogeneous. Sufficient conditions are 
given for an export policy that  increases the  welfare of the exporting country, 
improves its international terms of trade and increases its export. revenues. 
The characteristics which determine whether an expansion of resource 
exports is beneficial or harmful to the  economy are the  structure of the  econ- 
omy and the  endogenous factor prices. Since the equilibria and the  associated 
values of endogenous variables are determined for a given level of resource 
exports, i t  follows tha t  whether i t  is better to increase or decrease the volume 
of resources exported will depend on the equilibrium level of exports. I t  is 
therefore possible t o  determine the  optimal level of exports for an economy of 
a given structure. 
RESOURCES AND NORTH-SOUTH TRADE: 
A MACRO ANALYSIS IN OPEN ECONOMIES 
Graciela Chichilnisky* 
1. INTRODUCTION 
This paper explores the impacts of resource export policies on the major 
macro variables of exporting and importing economies. These impacts are 
traced back to changes in international terms of trade and in total revenues. 
The paper thus belongs to the emerging literature on macro analysis of open 
economies (e.g., Benavie, 1978; Bliss, 1981; Corden, 1982) as well as to the 
more recent body of work concerned with general equilibrium analysis of 
resource export policies (Chichilnisky, 1981, 1983; Cremer and Salehi, 1980; 
Dasgupta and Heal, 1979). 
The Nor thSouth  model proposed here is an extension of that given in 
Chichilnisky (1981) to an economy with two goods and three factors of produc- 
tion, one of which is traded internationally. The aim is to explore certain 
'Professor of Economics, Columbia University. This research was supported by NSF grant No. SES 
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issues in Nor thSouth  trade. The two trading regions (North and South) 
therefore have the macro characteristics of industrial and developing coun- 
tries, respectively. As in Chichilnisky (1981), the resource-exporting region 
has a dual structure; its traditional sector uses mostly labor, with very low 
capital o r  oil inputs, while its industrial sector is quite capital- and oil- 
intensive. The industrial economy has a more homogeneous structure and 
does not produce resources. For completeness. we also study a case (Theorem 
3) in which the resource importer is also a developing country. 
We consider here resources which are 'pure rent' goods, and are 
extracted mostly for export. The resource sector is linked t o  the domestic 
economy mainly through the  international market: resources are exchanged 
for industrial goods and these affect all domestic markets. 
We focus on certain issues of North--South resource trade which appear to 
be a t  odds with the conventional wisdom. With abundant resources, an export- 
ing economy is usually expected to  fare well, avoiding balance of payments 
and foreign exchange constraints, and the usual restrictions on industrial 
goods. * 
However, the  experiences of Mexico, Venezuela and Nigeria in recent 
years suggest that  the effects of concentrating on resource exports are more 
complex. The possible harmful consequences of exporting resources on the  
domestic economy have also featured in the  economic agendas of several 
industrial countries, such as t h e  UK, Holland and Australia, being variously 
referred to as a "de-industrialization" phenomenon, the "Dutch disease" and 
the "Gregory syndrome". For a review of this lat ter  literature on industrial 
economies, see, e.g.. Corden (1982). 
*Unless one postulates exogenous, absorptive constraints, as in Cremer and Salehi (1980). This is 
not done here. 
The point developed here is that resource exports may affect the market 
structure of a developing country in ways that  cannot be captured by one- 
sector models, requiring instead a general equilibrium analysis with a t  least 
twb productive sectors, traditional and industrial, and with variable market 
prices. The impact of resource exports can then be seen in the  changes they 
induce in relative prices and, in particular, in their effects on the  terms of 
trade between traditional and industrial sectors. These price changes in turn 
cause important income effects that  alter traditional links between interna- 
tional and domestic markets. 
The interest of the results lies in their simple, but somewhat unexpected, 
identification of the problems and solutions. Dual developing economies 
which trade resources for industrial goods with more homogeneous industrial 
economies may actually suffer if they increase their exports. Employment 
and consumption may decrease, and the terms of trade worsen. However, 
although export revenues decrease, there is an increase in domestic income 
from profits and an increase in the  ra te  of profit, explaining perhaps why 
trade takes place a t  all. The importing economy generally benefits more than 
the exporter in this case. 
In more integrated economies with more homogeneous technologies, 
increased exports have a positive domestic impact, although the  international 
terms of trade can worsen. The most positive outcomes occur when the  
exporter trades with a dual economy: real revenues generally increase with 
exports and the  main welfare indicators improve. However, the  welfare 
impacts on the resource importer may be less positive in this lat ter  case. The 
characteristics which determine whether a.1 expansion of resource exports is 
beneficial or harmful t o  an economy are the structure of the  economy and the 
endogenous 'factor prices. Since the  equilibria are characterized by the 
volume of resources exported, it follows that whether it is better to increase 
or decrease resource exports will depend on the equilibrium level of exports. 
I t  is therefore possible to  determine an optimal level of exports for an econ- 
omy of a given structure. This provides the optimal balance between domestic 
use and exports. 
The results indicate possible strategies for resource exporters, in that  
they identify precisely what constitutes an appropriate domestic environment 
for the export of resources and also determine an appropriate balance 
between domestic consumption and exports. They also provide a warning 
about excessive reliance on resource exports as a means of encouraging 
development. 
2. SPECIFICATION OF lTE MACRO MODEL 
The model considers two regions, called the 'North' and the 'South'. Each 
is represented by a general equilibrium system consistent with a competitive 
market economy. This model is an extension of that given in Chichilnisky 
(1981) with some notable differences: it includes three factors of production 
instead of two, and one of the regions trades a fac tor  (the resource) rather 
than a commodity. 
Each region produces two commodities: a 'basic' consumption good Band 
a luxury/investment good denoted I, which is also called the 'industrial' good. 
In addition, the South produces a resource, which from now on we shall call 
oil, denoted 6. Goods B and I are consumed; oil is an input of production. The 
other two inputs are capital K and labor L. The North exports industrial goods 
in exchange for oil from the South. The prices of the two commodities are 
denoted pg and pl; the prices of the three factors are p,,, r and w .  
We first outline the model of one region, the  South. There are  five 
behavioral equations, which describe production, supply of factors, and 
demand. The production system is formalized by the equations: 
where the superscripts B and I indicate the type of good and hence the sector,  
and the  superscript S, the supply. There is a constraint on oil supplies, 
d % d  . 
The supplies of labor and capital are  price dependent: 
where w denotes wages, T the r a t e  of profit o r  quasi r e n t  of capital andpB the  
price of B.* 
We postulate the following demand behavior a t  equilibrium: 
where L is total  labor employed and the superscript D denotes demand, i.e., B 
is a 'wage goode.** 
Equations (1)--(5) complete t he  behavioral assumptions of t he  model. 
Our next task is to define the general equilibrium of the  N o r t h S o u t h  model 
by the  solutions to a system of simultaneous equations. To this  end, we first 
'More general supply functions can be used for labor and capital, a t  the qost of increased complexi- 
ty. Examples include general linear functions such L~ = ( a w / p B )  + L and functions of the form 
Ls = ( w / P B ) ~ .  
"Equation (5) is only valid at  equilibrium; no disequilibrium demand behavior is specified as we 
are only concerned here with comparative static analysis across equilibria. While (5) simplifies the 
computations, it is not crucial to the results; all that is required is that the proportion of wage in- 
come spent in the industrial sector is significantly lower than that of profit income. 
derive certain relations between factor prices and commodity prices, and 
between output and employment of factors, which are  subsequently used to 
specify an equilibrium in the  simplest possible form. 
From the  production functions (1) and ( 2 ) ,  assuming competitive 
behavior, we obtain the  "dual" price equations relating factor and output 
prices: 
 PI=^^^ + b f l d + c 2 ~ ~  - (? )  
where rpI is the  "user's cost of capital". In addition, from (1) and (2) we derive 
a relation between levels of output and employment of factors: 
L = LB + LI = a l ~ S  + a21S (8) 
From (8) and (9) we obtain equations for the  supply of B and I in terms of 
labor and capital employed: 
B' = (c2L - azK)/ D 
where D = a lc2 - a2c 
The next s tep  is to  define the  equilibrium of the North-South model by 
the solutions to a system of simultaneous equations. Note tha t  once the 
equilibrium outputs of commodities B and I a re  known in one region, the  
employment of factors (labor, capital and oil) in this region can be determined 
from equations (8) and (9). 
An equilibrium in the commodity markets (B, I  and 2 9 )  of the South can 
be expressed by a system of four market-clearing equations: 
i.e., B is not traded internationally; 
I S = I D - x p  , 
where X! denotes imports of I ;  
where X$ denotes oil exports; and the balance of payments condition 
P+X$ =PIX? (16) 
We now consider the two-region model. We postulate the same behavioral 
equations (1)-(5) for the  North, and obtain another set of four equations 
analogous to (13)-(16), but possibly with different values for parameters a, 8 ,  
a*, a2, b b 2 .  c and cz. Also, @(N) = 0 since we assume that the  North pro- 
duces no oil. A world trade equilibrium can now be defined by a system of 
eight equations: (13)--(16) for the South, and the corresponding four equa- 
tions for the North. Note that, in a world trade equilibrium, the  exports of oil 
from the South @(s) must equal imports of oil to the North x ~ ( N ) ,  where the 
S and N in parentheses indicate that the variables refer to the South and the 
North, respectively. Similarly. x?(s) = Xjs(~). In addition, in a world equili- 
brium, the prices of traded commodities are equal across regions, i.e., p+(S) 
= p + ( N )  and pI(S) = pI(N). (The prices of non-traded factors and goods may, of 
course, differ between regions.) This implies that if the balanced budget condi- 
tion is met in the North it will also be met in the South, and vice versa. We 
therefore have a system of seven independent equations defining the  world 
trade equilibrium. 
In order to solve the model, we shall now rewrite these seven equations as 
functions of specific variables: prices, oil supplies and traded volumes. The 
equation BS = BD may be rewritten in view of ( l l ) ,  (3), (4) and (5) as: 
Next we shall rewrite IS = ID - xP. Noting that in equilibrium the 
national income identity 
is always satisfied, the demand equation (5) implies 
in equilibrium, where I9 = 0 in the North. Therefore, from (12).  (3), (4) and 
(19)  the  expression IS = ID - Xp is identical to: 
Similarly, from (10). (11) and (12),  the export equation for oil X: = d S  - g D  is 
Finally, we have, as before, one balance of payments condition: 
p a x i  = pIqD * (22) 
We therefore have seven equilibrium equations: (17).  (20).  (21) and (22) 
for the South, and those corresponding to (17) ,  (20)  and (21)  for the North. 
Recalling that in a trade equilibrium the prices of traded goods are equal 
across the  two regions, the seven equilibrium equations therefore depend on 
the following nine variables: pd , pI . w / p B  (N) ,  w / p B  (S), r ( N ) ,  r ( S ) ,  traded 
volumes x~)(s)  (= Af(N)), x$(s) (= x ~ ( N ) )  and oil supplied gS.  Therefore, as 
usual with general equilibrium models, we may solve the  system in relative 
prices, except for the value of o n e  variable whi.ch must be set exogenously. We 
choose the numeraire to be oil, i.e.. pg = 1, and the exogenously set variable 
to be the volume of oil exports, x ~ ( s ) .  For each volume of exports x:(s), we 
may therefore compute a (locally unique) equilibrium of the North-South 
economy, where the prices pl ,  T (S), r(hT), w/pB(S),  w/pB(N) and the  
volume of industrial goods exported qs(~) are all determined endogenously. 
From these values, we may also compute the equilibrium values of all other 
variables in the  N o r t h S o u t h  model: using the  supply equations (3) and (4) we 
obtain the  employment of factors in each region; using equations (11) and 
(12), t he  levels of output of B and I; from (5), demand for B; and from t h e  
price equations (6) and ( 7 ) ,  the  values of w a n d p ~  in each region. 
The North/South terms of trade p*/pI (= l /pI )  are therefore determined 
endogenously a t  each equilibrium, depending on the  volume of oil exported. 
The Appendix shows how these equilibrium positions may be calculated, and 
tha t  t h e  equilibria form a one-parameter family characterized by the volume 
of oil exported. 
The next section explores the  changes in the  major macro variables tha t  
follow a change in t h e  (exogenously determined) volume of oil exported G ( s ) .  
3. GAUGING THE ADVANTAGES OF OIL EXF'ORT POLICIES 
Here we explore the macro impact of a move towards a new world t rade 
equilibrium with a higher level of oil exports from the  South. As we shall see, 
certain characteristics of the economies of the two regions have quite a strik- 
ing effect on the results of such export policies, i.e., on the  volume of indus- 
trial goods which are traded for oil, on the  real wages, and on the overall con- 
sumption and employment of factors in both regions. This allows us to study 
the  possible advantages and disadvantages of different oil export policies, and 
to focus on the parameters that determine the outcomes of such policies. 
This section proves the main results analytically; possible policy implica- 
tions are discussed in the next section. The following assumptions are now 
made concerning the economies of the two regions: 
A1 D = a l c 2  - a 2 c 1  > 0 in both regions, i.e., the industrial good is 
more capital-intensive and the basic consumption good more 
labor-inten sive. 
The South's production of basic goods requires a lot of labor 
and only small amounts of oil and capital, i.e., b l  and c l  are 
small in the South. 
E = b l n 2  - b 2 a ,  > 0 in the North, i.e., the North's basic good is 
more oil-intensive and the industrial good more labor- 
intensive. Alternatively we may assume that b l a 2  - b 2 a l Z  0 ,  
i.e., they have approximately similar intensities in oil and 
labor. 
A3 is a natural assumption when, for example, the "non-traded" good B in the 
North is services or certain manufactures, and good I consumer durables, 
vehicles, military equipment, etc. It will be shown below that this assumption 
is not necessary to obtain the results, but i t  simplifies the computations con- 
siderably. 
We can now prove the following theorem: 
l h o r e m  1 .  Assume that  the economies  of the two  regions are  as spec i f ied  in 
Section 2, a n d  that  the foUowing condit ions are sa t i s f ied .  hz t h  Sbuth 
i . e . ,  t h e  e c o n o m y  is ' d u a l i s t i c ' i n  i t s  u s e  of capital  and  labor,  so t h a t  D is l a rge .  
In the  Nor th  
i . e . ,  t h e  s ec tor s  are r e l a t i v e l y  homogeneous .  We a s s u m e  t h e  r a t e s  of p ro f i t  t o  
be ~ e l a t i v e l y  high, so  t h a t  Zr > a D in b o t h  reg ions .  
In this case  a m o v e  t o w a r d s  a n e w  w o ~ l d  e q u i l i b r i u m  with i nc reased  oil 
e zpor t s  f ~ o m  t h e  S o u t h  w i l l  n e c e s s a r i l y  w o r s e n  the  t e r m s  of t rade  of t h e  S o u t h  
and decrease  its r e a l  T e v e n u e s .  Real w a g e s ,  to ta l  e m p l o y m e n t  and  t h e  domes -  
tic c o n s u m p t i o n  of basic  goods  w i l l  all dec~erz se  in t h e  Sou th .  
how eve^, t h e  r a t e  of p r o f i t  and  t h e  to ta l  p r o f i t  i n c o m e  w i l l  i n c r e a s e  in 
both  r e g i o n s  with i n c r e a s e d  t rade  in oil.* h t h e  Nor th ,  t h e  n e w  e q u i l i b r i u m  
wi l l  l e a d  t o  m o r e  e m p l o y m e n t ,  a n d  to  i n c r e a s e s  bo th  in t he  r ea l  w a g e  and in 
t h e  domes t i c  c o n s u m p t i o n  of bas ic  goods. 
Proof. The strategy of the proof is as follows. First we show that, under the 
stated conditions, an increase in oil imports raises the domestic rate of profit 
in the North across equilibria. Next we show that, as this rate of profit rises, 
the volume of industrial goods exported from the North x~(N) falls across 
equilibria, due to income effects. Therefore, in the new equilibrium with 
increased oil exports from the South, the North will export fewer industrial 
goods: the terms of trade of the South will worsen, and its real revenues in 
terms of industrial goods will fall. The rest of the proof traces the impact of 
the changes in the international market on the domestic economies of the two 
regions. 
*The fact that real wages w / p B  and the profit rate r increase in the North does not imply that 
both factor prices w and r move in the same direction in the North, since real wages are deflated 
by the price of the good B, w / p B ,  and B is not the numeraire. 
First we establish that the rate of profit in the North increases with the 
volume of oil exported from the South, i.e., 
ax2 (s)  
07 (N) 
> O  . 
Consider the amount of oil imported by the North hD(N). Since the North 
t 
produces no oil, @(N) = g D ( ~ ) .  In equilibrium, of course, @(N) = x ~ ( s ) ,  so 
that it suffices to find the sign of ax$(N)/&(N). The change in the rate of 
profit in the North as the South exports more oil can be traced to the changes 
in prices that  must take place in order that the North may utilize more oil. 
Since the total volume of oil required by the North is the sum of oil 
demands in the industrial sector I and in the basic goods sector B: 
gD(N) =#(N) = b21S(N) + blBS(N) . (23) 
In order to find the relationship between oil imports and the rate of profit 
in the North, we now write IS and BS as functions of the total labor and capital 
employed. Dropping the region identifier (N) where the region is obvious: 
where we have used equations (12). (3) and (5). Since the factors employed 
depend on their prices ((3) and (4)). we obtain 
so that  
In order to  determine the sign of (26) we study the relationship between 
real wages and  profits in the  North: 
a (w/  P R ) ( N )  
a r  (N 
From equation (17) we obtain an  expression relating changes in real 
wages to changes in the rates  of profit across equilibria: 
This equation implies tha t  t he  sign of a(w/pB)/ ar  is always the  same a s  t ha t  
of (c z/ D) - (2w /pB). Substituting (27) into (26) and  rearranging yields: 
which, in view of assumptions A3 and C.2, mus t  be positive. Therefore, the 
equilibrium ra t e  of profit in the North increases with the volume of oil 
ezported f rom the South. Note tha t  (28) could also be positive even if E < 0. 
The assumption E > 0 is only used in  this  par t  of t he  proof, and  thus  i t  is not  
strictly necessary to  obtain the  required results. 
We consider next t h e  relation between the ra te  of profit in the North r(N) 
and  the  volume of i ts  industrial exports, ~X?(N)/ ar(N). Note t ha t  since d = 0 
in the North, (19) implies ID = rK. Since @(N) = IS - ID, we have from (3), 
(4), (12) and (19): 
Since al /  D < 2 r  (condition 2) and  since a(w/pB)/  dr > 0, both t e rms  on 
the right-hand side of (29) a r e  negative: thus  the  ra te  of profit.r(N) increases 
as exports from the North decrease, i.e., 
Since the supply of industrial goods rS is an increasing function of r ,  and by 
definition. qs= I' - rD, it follows that as t h e  r a t e  o f  pro f i f  r ( N )  i n c r e a s e s ,  t h e  
d e m a n d  f o r  industrial goods in t h e  Nor th  must i nc rease  m o r e  than does its 
supply. This is due to income effects in the ~ o r t h :  the demand for industrial 
goods increases significantly following a rise in the user's cost of capital. 
Therefore, e z p o r t s  of i n d u s t r i a l  goods decrease  us t he  r a t e  o f  p ro f i t  r(N) 
i n c r e a s e s .  
Expressions (28) and (30) together imply that  
i.e., the a m o u n t s  of oil e zpor t ed  a n d  indvstrial goods  i m p o r t e d  by t h e  S o u t h  
m o v e  in oppos i te  d i r ec t ions  acros s  equi l ibr ia .  
Since qS(s) = p l ~ f ) ( ~ ) ,  we have thus shown that 
i.e., a m o v e  t o w a r d s  a w o r l d  e q u i l i b r i u m  wifh i nc reased  oil e z p o r t s  f r o m  the  
S o u t h  i n c r e a s e s  t h e  r e la t i ve  pr ice  of i n d u s t r i a l  goods,  i .e . ,  w o r s e n s  t h e  t e n n s  
of trade of t h e  Suth Furthermore, from (31), the volume of industrial goods 
imported by the South @(s) = x?(N) decreases as the volume of oil exported 
increases, so that the r e a l  revenues obtained by the oil exporter, in terms of 
industrial goods, have decreased as well. This completes the part of the proof 
concerned with international market effects. 
We turn now to the welfare implications of an increase in oil exports from 
the South on the domestic economies of the two regions. The proof will 
proceed by tracing the impact of the higher prices of industrial goods arising 
from the increase in oil exports. Under the stated assumptions, the rate of 
profit r (S)  in the South increases with the price of industrial goods pl. How- 
ever, because of the dual nature of the  southern economy (C.l), real wages, 
total employment and the domestic consumption of B in the South all fall as 
pl and r(S)  rise. 
We then consider the macro impacts on the North. Since the northern 
economy is relatively more homogeneous, a n  increase in the  ra te  of profit in 
the North T (N) is associated with higher real wages, employment and domestic 
consumption of B in the North. This will complete the proof of the theorem. 
Our next task is thus to  study the  relationship between the international 
price of industrial goods p1 and the ra te  of profit in the  South r(S). 
Firstly, note tha t  as  the rate  of profit r (S)  increases, the total capital K 
available in the  South increases, and therefore the supply of industrial goods, 
which are  capital-intensive, also increases. Formally, since 
a n d K  = BT, we have 
which is positive, since, from the dual nature of the  economy (condition C.1) 
and (2'7). real wages and profits move in opposite directions in the South, 
a(w / p B ) /  a~ < o. 
As the supply of industrial goods IS  increases with the ra te  of profit, the 
demand for oil must  also increase in the South. This is because production of 
B requires little oil (b is small) and oil demand is: 
sD(s) = b 2 1 S +  b l ~ '  . 
Therefore, 
Since g S  = d D  + G, and p$f) = pdg, we obtain (when P+ = 1): 
lpD + p l ( rK  - Is) = 0 
so that  
We shall now check that  the  price of industrial goods increases with the rate of 
profit across equilibria. 
As 27 > a l /  D in the South by assumption, the expression 
is negative when c is small. 
Therefore, as r (S)  increases, t h e  denominator of (36) decreases and the 
numerator increases. I t  follows that  the equi l ibr ium price of industrial  goods 
increases  w i t h  the r a t e  of prof i t  in the Sbuth, i.e., 
which means that  increases  in oil e zpor t s  are accompanied b y  increases  in the 
rate  of profit in the S o u t h  
Now, from condition C . l  and ( 2 7 ) .  an increase in the ra te  r ( S )  has the 
opposite effect on real wages: rea l  w a g e s  in the South W / ~ ~ ( S )  decr eas e  w i t h  
i n c reas ing  oil e z p o r t s .  
Together with equation (3), this  implies that  total employment must  also 
decrease in the  South; and since B~ = w L / p B  (by 5 )  consumption of basic 
goods in the South must  decrease a s  well. 
Finally, we prove tha t  increased exports of oil from the South have the  
opposite effect on the  economy of t h e  North. As imports of oil from the South 
x$(s) increase, the  rate  of profit in the North r ( N )  increases (by ( 2 8 ) ) .  The 
rate  of profit r(N) now moves in the same direction as real wages (from C.2 
and (27)). Therefore, r e d  w a g e s  a n d  the r a t e  of p r o f i l  bo th  i n c r e a s e  in the 
North w i t h  i n c r e a s e s  in oil i m p o r t s .  As real wages U J / ~ ~ ( N )  increase, ( 3 )  
shows tha t  the  to ta l  e m p l o y m e n t  of labor  L(N) w i l l  a l so  i n c r e a s e ,  a n d  the t o ta l  
c o n s u m p t i o n  of basic goods  in the North, B~ = t ~ ( w / ~ ~ ) ~ ,  m u s t  i n c r e a s e  as 
w e l l .  
This completes the  proof of the  theorem. 
In view of the negative impacts of increased oil exports on t h e  economy of 
the South, i t  seems natural  to  consider whether an economy with these 
characteristics would export oil at all. One possible answer is tha t  such an 
economy may export oil because the  effects of increased oil exports a re  not  
uniformly bad across all income groups: both the rate  of profit and the  total 
profit income of the South increase with increases in oil exports, although the  
total real revenues of the region as a whole decrease. The following corollary 
focuses this result  t o  demonstrate more clearly the role of the  conditions of 
Theorem 1 on the welfare of different income groups. 
Corollary. Consider a m o v e  towards a n e w  e q u i l i b r i u m  character ized  b y  
increased  oil e z p o r t s  f r o m  the South ,  and l o w e r  real  e z p o r t  r e v e n u e s .  If t h e  
e c o n o m y  of t h e  S o u t h  has the  character is t ics  a s s u m e d  in T h e o r e m  1,  t h e n  bo th  
t h e  r a t e  o f  prof i f  a n d  the  total profif  i n c o m e  of t h e  S o u t h  will be h igher  a t  t h e  
n e w  e q u i l i b r i u m ,  i n d e p e n d e n t  of t h e  character is t ics  of t h e  n o r t h e r n  e c o n o m y .  
R o o f .  Consider a new equilibrium with increased oil exports, and lower real 
revenues for the South, ~x$(s)/ axf(s) < 0. 
This implies that the relative price of industrial goods pl increases in the 
new equilibrium, i.e., the terms of trade of the South worsen. From (38) this 
implies that  the rate of profit in the South r(S) increases. Since by (4) 
K = PT, the total capital employed in the South also increases. Therefore since 
7 , pl and I all increase, the  total profit income rplK will necessarily increase 
as well, thus completing the proof of the corollary. 
The next result explores the conditions under which increases in oil 
exports have pos i t ive  e f f e c t s  on the welfare of the exporting region. This 
highlights the role of the structure of the economy in determining the welfare 
effects of oil export policies. 
W o ~ e m  2. A s s u m e  that the e c o n o m i e s  of t h e  t w o  reg ions  are  as a s s u m e d  in 
m o r e m  1 ,  e z c e p t  that t h e  cond i t ion  c2/ D < 2 w / p B  f o ~  t h e  Sufh is Teplaced 
by c2/ D > 2 w / p g ,  i .e . ,  t h e r e  is moTe homogeneous  u s e  of  capital and lab0T. 
W n  an i n c r e a s e  in oil e z p o d s  wiU  w o r s e n  t h e  S z l t h ' s  t e r m s  of  t ~ a d e  a n d  
dec~err se  its Teal  T e v e n u e s ,  b u t  p o p s ,  Teal w a g e s ,  e m p l o y r n e n f  a n d  d o m e s t i c  
c o n s u m p t i o n  of  basic goods  w i l l  a l l  i n c ~ e a s e  at e q u i l i b r i u m .  
R o o f .  An increase in the export of oil from the South X$ will have a negative 
impact on the equilibrium volume of industrial goods imported @ and the  
South's terms of trade, since these depend only on the general equilibrium 
reaction of the North to increased oil exports from the South. (Recall that the 
northern economy is still exactly as assunled in Theorem 1.) 
S Increasing the amount of oil exported Xd will again increase the rate of 
profit in the South, although not for the same reasons as in Theorem 1 
Consider expression (36): 
The denominator, IS - rK, decreases with r since 
has a negative sign because 27 > a l /  D and (27) implies that a(w/pB)/  a r  > 0. 
The numerator 2pD increases with r ,  since the expression 
is positive when c l  is small. Therefore pl increases with the rate of profit 
T(S). The rate of profit r(S), in turn. increases with oil exports, as seen above. 
Therefore, the  price of industrial goods increases with oil exports: 
Finally, when the  use of capital and labor is relatively homogeneous, so 
that c2/  D > 2w/pB, we have a(w/pB)/ ar > 0 (as noted above), so that  real 
wages increase with the rate of profit in the South. 
Thus, as  oil exports increase, so do real wages. From (3) employment in 
the South al.so increases, and from (5) domestic consumption of B grows as 
well. This completes the proof. 
Finally, we explore conditions under which the real revenues of the  oil 
exporter can be expected to improve as the amount of oil exported increases. 
I t  will, of course, be necessary to assume that  the oil importer has different 
characteristics to  those put forward in Theorem 1. 
Theorem 3. Assllme tha t  the  oil impor ter  has the  characterist ics described in 
m o r e m  1 with two  major  ezcept ions:  
1. Its economy is qui te  'dualist ic '  in its u s e  of capital and labor,  i . e , ,  
c Z / D  < 2 w / p B .  
2. Its basic goods sector  u s e s  re lat iuely  f e w  capital i n p u t s ,  i . e . ,  c - 0. 
27wn a n  increase in oil ezports  wi l l  increase  the  real  r e u e n u e s  of the  oil 
ezporter  and  improve  its t e r m s  of t rade .  h the  oil-importing coun t7y ,  t h e  ra te  
of prof i t  a n d  the  domestic u s e  of industrial goods will both decrease a s  a r e s u l t  
of increased  oil i m p o r t s ,  bu t  real  wages ,  employment  a n d  c o n s u m p t i o n  of 
basic goods wil l  all increase .  
R o o f ,  Under the conditions of this theorem, we have (from equation 28) 
since c Z / D  < 2 w / p B .  Therefore a s  oil imports increase, the  rate of profit 
decreases in the oil-importing country. 
From equation (29) ,  since c - 0 and 27 > a l D ,  we obtain 
which implies that industrial exports now increase as oil imports increase: 
the  real revenues of the oil importer now improve with increased oil exports. 
Since (c2/ D) - (2w/pB) is now negative for the oil-importing country, 
a(w/pB)/ a r  < 0 from (27), i.e., a lower profit rate is associated with higher 
real wages, employment and domestic consumption of basic goods (see also (3) 
and (5)). 
Equation (33) and a ( ~ / ~ ~ ) / a r  < 0 imply that the domestic supply of 
industrial goods IS now decreases since the rate of profit r decreases as oil 
imports increase. Since the domestic use of industrial goods equals 
Is -x?, and exports X? are increasing while output IS is decreasing, the 
volume of industrial goods used domestically ID must therefore be lower. This 
completes the proof. 
4. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
The results suggest that certain macro characteristics of the trading 
economies will have a significant effect on the outcomes of resource export 
policies. This section summarises our findings and suggests ways in which 
they may be useful in policy analysis. 
We studied the conditions under which increasing the export of resources 
has either positive or negative consequences for the exporting economy. 
These conditions concern the internal characteristics of the trading 
economies: when the exporter uses capital and labor with different intensities 
in different sectors of the economy, and the importer employs these factors 
more homogeneously, increasing resource exports may lead to worse terms of 
trade for the exporter, lower real wages and employment levels, but higher 
profits (Theorem 1). When the exporter has a more homogeneous economy, 
the results are partly, or fully, reversed (Theorems 2 and 3). 
I t  is interesting that one of the crucial conditions on which the results of 
resource trade depend is the same condition that explains gains or losses from 
trade in basic goods in a previous paper (Chichilnisky, 1981). This is a meas- 
ure of the  homogeneity of the economy, expressed by ( c 2 /  D) - ( 2 . l l i / ~ ~ )  < 0, 
where D represents the level of "duality" in the economy and w / p B  is the real 
i 
wage. When the  importer has a more homogeneous economy than the  
exporter ( ( c 2 /  D )  - ( 2 w / p B )  > 0) and the  rates of profit are high (a,/ D < 27) .  
then the  relation between oil exports and their price slopes downward across 
equgibriu,  as was the  case for the  export of basic consumption goods in Chi- 
chilnisky (1901).  I t  therefore seems worth discussing the  role of the expres- 
sion ( c 2 /  D )  - ( 2 w / p B )  further.  
The sign of the  expression ( c 2 / D )  - ( 2 w / p g )  determines whether the  
profit ra te  and real wages vary directly or inversely across equilibria. The 
extent t o  which the  rewards t o  capital and labor move together, or in opposite 
directions, therefore seems to  depend on the homogeneity of the economy. I t  
seems that,  in more homogeneous economies, increases in the  ra te  of profit 
have a positive external effect on real wages, while in 'dual' economies, they 
compete, one increasing only when the  other decreases. 
I t  may be useful t o  explain briefly what 'drives' the  results, starting with 
the  impact of increased resource exports on the international economy and on 
the  resou~ce- impor t ing  region. 
We saw in Theorem 1 t ha t  a higher volume of resources is traded for a 
lower volume of industrial goods, so tha t  the relative price of industrial goods 
increases a t  the new world equilibrium. What drives this result is a negative 
con-elation between the  price of industrial goods and the  volume of industrial 
goods exported. This negative correlation is similar to  tha t  demonstrated in 
Chichilnisky (1981)  between the  volume of labor-intensive basic goods 
exported from a developing country and their price. In both cases, the  nega- 
tive correlation is due to  general equilibrium income e f fec t s ,  effects tha t  can 
be observed only as we allow supply and demand curves to shift simultane- 
ously. As the price of industrial goods rises, the domestic supply increases, 
but the domestic demand increases more, thus lowering the surplus available 
for export. Higher oil exports are associated with higher profits and higher 
industrial prices; therefore increases in oil exports are associated with a 
decrease in industrial exports. The terms of trade of the industrial exporter 
necessarily improve. 
This improvement in terms of trade benefits the industrial economy: 
since this type of economy is quite homogeneous and integrated, an increased 
supply of industrial goods leads to higher levels of overall employment, real 
wages, and consumption of both goods. The impacts of increased resource 
imports are thus unambiguously positive for an industrial exporter. 
These results are  reversed when the resource-importing economy is less 
homogeneous, has a "dual" economic structure, and uses less capital and 
resources to produce its basic consumption good. (These features are perhaps 
more characteristic of a developing resource-importing economy.) The 
impacts of an increase in resource imports are then less positive. This is 
demonstrated in Theorem 3 by tracing the general equilibrium effects 
corresponding to those observed in Theorem 1. Following an increase in 
resource imports, the importing country uses less industrial goods and its 
rate of profit is smaller. However, the equilibrium values of real wages, 
employment and consumption of basic goods are all higher. Increasing the 
amount of resources imported seems to  lead to an economy more oriented to 
basic consumption and production, a form of 'de-industrialization'. 
So far we have examined the impacts of increasing resource exports on 
the resource-importing country and on the international economy. 'We shall 
now discuss the impact of these international market changes on the resource 
ezporter.  
As with the above results, different degrees of heterogeneity and lack of 
integration lead to rather different results. In Theorem 1, the resource- 
exporting region has a dual economy, uses few capital and resource inputs in 
its basic consumption sector, and initially has a relatively high profit rate. In 
this case, increases in resource export volumes increase profits and total pro- 
fit income, but the terms of trade and the export revenues of the region both 
fall. 
Due t o  the heterogeneity and lack of integration of this economy, 
increased profits lead not to higher, but rather to Lower levels of employment, 
real wages and wage income, as well a s  to  decreased output and consumption 
of basic goods. In order to  regain its previous level of consumption of indus- 
trial goods, the region must  now increase its industrial output, since imports 
have decreased. The only gain from increased resource exports is an increase 
in profit income. These results are  traced, in Theorem 1 as well as in Chichil- 
nisky (1981), to  general equilibrium income effects. which are very sensitive 
t o  the degree of dualism of the economy. These results appear more sharply 
in the  Corollary, which considers only the characteristics of the exporting 
economy. 
The overall conclusion is that an integrated and homogeneous economy 
may benefit unambiguously from increased imports of resources from a 
region which has a dual economy. For the resource exporter to benefit from 
increased exports i t  seems to be necessary to trade with similar economies, or 
else to keep its economy as integrated and homogeneous as possible. The 
results are therefore very similar to those given in Chichilnisky (1981), 
although they apply to rather different sets of circumstances, as discussed 
above. 
In 'dual' economies, the proceeds from resource exports go mainly to a 
small, internationally linked, industrial sector. Under these conditions, reli- 
ance on resource exports may worsen the international position of the econ- 
omy in the long run if the region trades with a more homogeneous industrial 
economy. Resource exports may translate into higher profit income, but this 
does not necessarily 'circulate' through the economy; i t  may raise the price of 
imported industrial goods, without bringing about improvements in welfare 
(employment, real wages, etc.). 
I t  should be noted that the characteristics which determine whether 
expansion of oil exports is desirable or not also determine the optimal balance 
of goods between domestic and foreign markets. This can be seen as follows. 
The characteristics concerned are the structure of the economy (which is exo- 
genous) and the endogenous factor prices. Since the equilibria of the econ- 
omy are calculated for given export volumes, it follows that whether the effect 
of increasing resource exports is beneficial or not will depend on the initial 
export level and the structure of the domestic economy. The equilibrium 
level of exports also affects the desirability of expanding oil exports. Thus, it 
is possible to use these results to obtain an optimal level of exports for a given 
economy, i.e., one that balances the export sector with the other sectors of 
the domestic economy. 
A number of extensions and improvements of this model seem desirable. 
In particular, some of the dynamic aspects of the problem may be usefully 
developed in the context of optimal depletion rates c! la Hotelling. 
APPENDIX 
In this appendix explicit solutions to the model are found. I t  is shown. in par- 
ticular, that the set of equilibria describes a one-parameter family, character- 
ized by the volume of resources exported. 
Oil will be taken as the numeraire in the following analysis, i.e., pb = 1. 
We shall first explore the relationships between factor markets and the 
domestic market for basic consumption goods in each region. The links 
between these domestic markets and the international markets for oil and 
industrial goods will then be examined. 
Consider now the equilibrium relation B~ - BS = 0. A t  equilibrium we 
have, from ( 3 )  and ( 5 ) ,  
and from ( 3 ) ,  (4) and (11) 
a c  zu, 
BS = ( c 2 ~  - a 2 K ) / D  = (-- @ a 2 r ) / D  . 
PB 
This is a quadratic expression in w / p B ,  whose roots are 
Thus (A4) gives two equilibrium values of real wages for each given rate of 
profit, as  well as an upper bound for r ,  in each region: 
Note tha t  the  smaller root of w/pB in (A4) is an increasing function of r ,  and 
the  larger a decreasing function of r .  
Consider the amount of industrial goods imported by the  South. @(s). 
Across the  equilibria we have, by definition, 
x p = r D - I ~  . (A 6) 
From the national income identity (18) and the demand condition (5). we 
obtain the  following equation for the  amount of industrial goods imported a t  
equilibrium: 
Now, p&(S) = p d $ ( ~ )  across equilibria because of the balance of payments 
condition. Since d  = d D  + @, we have 
when the  southern economy is in equilibrium. Substituting the  equations for 
the supply of labor (3) ,  capital (4) and industrial goods (12) in to  (A.8) yields 
the following implicit relation between the international equilibrium price of 
industrial goods, p;, and the domestic factor prices (rate  of profit and real 
wages) in  the South: 
We saw in (A.4) t h a t  w / p B  is a (two-branched) function of T ,  and  so substitut- 
ing ( k 4 )  into (kg) leads to an  expression linking the  ra te  of profit in the  South 
r (S)  and  the  international price of industrial goods, pz, across equilibria. 
We shall now turn  t o  the  North. Consider the  amount  of industrial goods 
exported @(N). Recalling tha t  the North does not produce oil, we obtain the  
equilibrium relation 
x~'(N) = - I ~  = ( ( a l ~  - C ~ L ) / D )  -TK (A. 10) 
where the  parameters  and  variables now refer to  t he  North. 
We shall show tha t  for each  given value of oil exports f rom the  South 
x ~ ( s ) ,  t h e  N o r t h S o u t h  general equilibrium model is 'closed', and a solution 
can be given analytically. 
Since G ( s )  = g ( ~ )  a t  equilibrium, (3), (4) and (5) can  be used t o  obtain 
an expression relating the  amount  of oil exported from the  South and the  fac- 
tor  prices in the  North: 
(A. 11) 
(the variables and parameters on the right-hand side are for the North). Thus 
( A l l )  gives an implicit relation between two factor prices in the  North, r(N) 
and w/pB(N) for each level of oil exports. 
Using this equation together with (A.4). which gives another (indepen- 
dent) implicit relation between these factor prices, we can then obtain the 
equilibrium values r(N)* and w/pB(N)* corresponding to each given oil export 
volume G ( s ) .  
From equations (3) and (4) i t  is then possible to  calculate the equilibrium 
utilization of labor and capital in the North, L(N)* and K(N)*. Equations (11) 
and (12) can then be used to compute the output of consumption good B and 
industrial good I a t  equilibrium, B(N)* and /(N)*. From (A 10) we determine 
the amount of industrial goods exported qS(N)*. We then determine the 
demand for oil in the North, . s~(N)*,  from equation (15), and using the  balance 
of payments condition, d D ( ~ ) *  = x$(s)* = pIx?(N)*, we obtain the  interna- 
tional equilibrium price of industrial goods p; 
Finally. we consider the following two price equations (for the North), 
which may be derived directly from the production relations (1) and (2) under 
the assumption that  factors are  used competitively: 
P ~ = a z ~  + b 9 + + c ~ T ~  . (A. 13) 
Recalling that  oil is assumed to be the numeraire, and since both pI(N)* 
and r(N)* are already known, we can obtain the nominal wage w(N)* from 
(k13). We can then calculate the equilibrium price of B , pB(N)*, from (A. 12). 
This completes an equilibrium solution for the North, for any given volume of 
oil exports from the South hS(s). 
We shall now compute the equilibrium for the South, noting tha t  for each 
given x ~ ( s )  we have already determined both the level of industrial imports to  
the  South (since @(s)* = x?(N)* a t  equilibrium) and  the  international equili- 
brium price of these imports p; Equations ( k 4 )  and  (A.ll)  therefore give two 
(independent) relations between real wages and the  ra te  of profit in the  South, 
which allows u s  to  compute the equilibrium values w/pg(S)* and r(S)*. From 
equations (AlZ) and (A.13) we then  obtain pB(S)* and w(S)*; from (3) and (4), 
K(S)* and  L(S)*; from (11) and (12), rS(s)* and BS(s)*; and  from (15), 'LP(S)*. 
This completes a general equilibrium solution of the  N o r t h S o u t h  model. 
Note t h a t  for each level of oil exports xS(s) there will generally exist more  
than one solution, depending on the  initial parameter  values and the  charac- 
teristics of both economies. However, there should be only a finite number of 
these solutions. i.e., they a re  locally unique. Thus, as  the  scalar x$(s) varies. 
we obtain a (local) one-parameter family of equilibria. Note also tha t  a level of 
oil supplies below t h e  feasible bound 'LP may be obtained for some equilibria. 
This can  happen as follows. For each level of oil exports from the  South %(S). 
we obtain the  level of imports of industrial goods qD(s)* and  their equilibrium 
price from the  equilibria of the  North (computed as  above). Given these  
two variables, t he  domestic supply of basic and industrial goods in t h e  South, 
BS' and rS*, is determined, which allows us to calculate the  domestic demand 
for oil in the  South, 'LPD = b l ~ S  + b2rS. The feasibility condition requires t h a t  
x$(s) + dD(s)  S 'LP, but the  above computation of total oil used does not  imply 
tha t  all t he  oil available is actually utilized, i.e., x ~ ( s )  + 'LPD(s) < 8 is in princi- 
ple possible. However, i t  is interesting t o  note t ha t  even though there  may be 
"excess supply" of oil a t  equilibrium, the  relative price of oil need not be zero 
because the  relative price of oil is determined by the international marke t  
equilibrium condition 
i.e., the model assumes a "passive" determination of relative oil prices by real 
international markets. 
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